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Psychological essentialism is the view that people think that members of certain categories, like skunk, 
share an essence.  The essence is not directly observable, but it is the true nature shared among category 
members and it is responsible for similarities among members of a category.  That we represent 
categories in terms of essences is a substantive psychological thesis, one that is supported by decades of 
research in psychology (see e.g., Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989; Medin and Ortony, 1989).  
What do we associate with the essence of a category?  The standard account of essentialism holds that the 
essence is represented with a “placeholder” (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Medin and Ortony, 1989).  This view—
placeholder essentialism—suggests that “a person believes that there is some causal essence that holds a 
category together, without knowing just what that essence is” (Gelman, 2004, p. 405).  This view traces at 
least as far back to Locke (1671/1959) who maintained that “[Essence is] the very being of anything, 
whereby it is what it is.  And thus the real, internal but generally…unknown constitution of things, 
whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence” and is explicitly endorsed by 
Gelman (2003) and Keil (1989).  
Placeholder essentialism doesn’t suggest that we can never elaborate the placeholder.  Indeed, Gelman 
(2003) suggests that, though rare, at least one way the placeholder can be elaborated is with the 
acquisition of relevant scientific knowledge.  Gelman (2003) maintains that we might, for instance, come 
to fill out the placeholder of “gold” once we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold 
is 79.  This view—what we call scientific essentialism—is associated with Kripke (1980) and Putnam 
(1975).  One of Kripke’s (1980) leading suggestions was that: “[C]onsiderations... about an object having 
essential properties, can only be regarded correctly, in my view, if we recognize the distinction between a 
prioricity and necessity. One might very well discover essence empirically.” (p. 110). That is, there are 
some a posteriori necessary truths and so science sometimes uncovers essences.  One important example, 
due to Putnam (1975), is that the empirical discovery that water is composed of H2O revealed that the 
essence of water is H20. So, according to scientific essentialism, such essences are sometimes uncovered 
by science. The placeholder can thus be elaborated, replaced, with the acquisition of relevant scientific 
knowledge.  Scientific essentialism can fill the placeholder. 
But there is reason to doubt that the placeholder is elaborated by a scientific essence.  For instance, Malt 
(1994) finds that people say that tea is 91% H20 but not water and that pool water is 81.6% H20 and is 
water.  So a liquid, such as tea can have more H20 than another liquid, such as pool water, yet not be 
categorized as water.  This is not at all what we would expect if the scientific essence fills the 
placeholder.   
What then might fill in the placeholder?  Our proposal is that people tacitly regard essences in terms of a 
telos.  Teleological thinking begins in childhood, with children maintaining that lions are for “going to the 
zoo,” that clouds are “for raining” (Bloom, 2007, p. 150), that “mountains exist to give animals a place to 
climb,” and that rocks are pointy “so that animals won’t sit on them and smash them” (Kelemen, 1999, 
pgs. 1444–45; see also Piaget, 2017).  These childhood tendencies toward teleological thinking aren’t 
simply outgrown.  Rather they extend into adults.  For instance, college-educated adults think that “the 
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sun radiates heat because warmth nurtures life,” that “fungi grow in forests to help decomposition,” and 
that “lightening occurs to release electricity” (Kelemen and Rosset, 2009). Perhaps even more 
surprisingly, teleological thinking isn’t supplanted by the acquisition of scientific knowledge: even 
professional physicists display a tendency to endorse inappropriate teleological explanations (Kelemen et 
al., 2013). 
Teleological thinking also plays a core role in our judgments about both existence and persistence. Rose 
and Schaffer (2017) found that people tended to say that a collection of parts forms a whole when those 
parts serve a collective purpose.  For example, they found that when an agent superglues some mice 
together, and the plurality of mice serve the function of detecting bombs, participants were significantly 
more inclined to think that the arrangement of mice composed a larger object in comparison to a case 
where mice were superglued together but had no function.  And Rose (2015) and Rose, Schaffer and 
Tobia (forthcoming) found that we tend to think that something persists through part alterations provided 
it preserves its purpose.  To take just one example, Rose, Schaffer and Tobia (forthcoming) found that 
participants who read about a gardening tool that underwent changes which resulted in the thing either 
still working or not working as a gardening tool were significantly more inclined to think the original 
thing still existed when it worked as a gardening tool. 
These findings indicate a robust role for teleological thinking in commonsense. This raises the intriguing 
possibility that teleology is also central to our essentialist inclinations.  In particular, people might be 
inclined to associate the essence with a kind of telos.  If so, then perhaps the placeholder for an essence is 
elaborated by a telos. That would then suggest that the standard view of the elaboration of the 
placeholder—scientific essentialism—be replaced by an Aristotelian conception of essence. 
For Aristotle, the essence is what defines the category.  More importantly for our purposes, for at least 
many categories, the essence is given by the telos. With respect to, for instance, living things, the essence 
of a category is the same as the end or telos of the creature.  This is made vivid in the following:  
Advancing bit by bit in this same direction it becomes apparent that even in plants features 
conducive to an end occur—leaves, for example, grow in order to provide shade for the fruit. If 
then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and 
plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and send their roots down rather than up for the sake of 
nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by 
nature. And since nature is twofold, as matter and as form, the form is the end, and since all other 
things are for sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of 
which. (Phys. 199a20–32) 
The key point, for present purposes, is that what matters for Aristotle is the final cause— the end—not an 
entity that produces the end. This view—what we call teleological essentialism—is in sharp contrast to 
the standard view of the elaboration of the placeholder, that placeholders are elaborated by scientific 
essences, endorsed by many psychologists. 
Our question is whether manipulating a thing’s telos affects categorization judgments. And our strategy 
for addressing this was to use the same procedures typically used in the essentialism literature and simply 
vary the original thing’s telos.  
But how do we determine whether telos plays a role in essentialist thinking?  One option would be to 
stipulate the telos of a thing, vary whether it preserves or changes its telos and see whether that affects 
categorization judgments.  Our approach, however, was to simply ask people what they associate with the 
telos of a thing.  In a pilot study, we asked people, for instance, “What is the true purpose of bees?” and 
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“What is the true purpose of spiders?” and gave them an open-ended response.  The results indicated that 
82% of participants thought that the true purpose of bees is to either make honey, pollinate flowers or 
both.  And 77% of participants thought that the true purpose of spiders is to either spin webs, catch and 
eat insect or both.  The results from our pilot study will thus serve as a guide for varying telos. 
Accordingly, in study 1 we utilize cases—inspired by work from Keil (1989)—where a bee undergoes 
superficial transformation.  Scientists remove its wings, antenna, lengthen its legs and so forth.  The 
original thing, then, ends up looking like a spider.  In addition to the superficial transformation, we varied 
whether the thing preserved or changed its telos.  In study 2, we utilize a different approach: 
transformation of the insides of a thing while holding superficial similarity fixed.  To accomplish this, 
participants were told that a bee had its insides replaced with the insides of a spider.  Yet the thing still 
looks like a bee.  We then varied whether the thing preserved or changed its telos.  In our third study, we 
investigated the role of “nature/nurture”.  Here we told participants that a newborn bee was placed in a 
cage full of spiders and again varied whether the thing preserved or changed its telos. In our fourth study, 
we utilized the same cases as used in study 1, but added the additional variation that the thing after the 
special operation had its eggs fertilized by a bee or spider.  The key question here is whether preservation 
or change of telos will guide people’s judgments about what will hatch from the eggs. Finally, in study 5 
we test whether teleological essentialist judgments generate category judgments. 
In addition to investigating whether the placeholder for an essence is elaborated by a telos, we had 
another goal.  Different approaches to investigating essentialism sometimes turn up conflicting results.  
For instance, studies investigating essentialist judgments in the context of a thing that undergoes 
superficial transformations—e.g., a racoon that is made to look like a skunk—sometimes turn up results 
that conflict with those in studies investigating the role of nature/nurture— e.g., a baby cow that is raised 
by pigs—in essentialist judgments.  But if we are right that the placeholder for an essence is elaborated by 
a telos, then we should expect that these different ways of investigating essentialism will turn up 
converging results.  In short: teleological essentialism should yield unification.   
 
1. Study 1: Superficial Transformation 
Two-hundred and fifty participants (aged 18-68 years, mean age = 30 years; 115 females; 97% reporting 
English as a native language) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions [marked by brackets]: 
Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a 
special operation on a bee.  They removed its wings and antennae, lengthened its legs and added a 
new pair of legs. They also inserted into the back of it something for making webs and trained the 





After the special operation, it looked like this: 
 
[Telos Changed: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special operation 
didn’t pollinate flowers or make honey.  Instead, it only spun webs to catch insects and eat 
them./Telos Preserved: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special 
operation didn’t spin webs to catch insects and eat them.  Instead, it only pollinated flowers and 
made honey.] 
After reading one of the two cases, participants responded to two comprehension questions: 
Comprehension Check: Suzy and Andy performed a special operation on a bee. (Yes/No) 
Comprehension Check: The thing after the special operation only spins webs to catch insects and 
eat them. (Yes/No) 
They were then asked the key test question: 
Category: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation is a bee or spider? 
(1=it is definitely a bee, 7=it is definitely a spider) 
In order to ensure that our manipulation was effective, we included a question about whether the thing 
retained the true purpose of bees: 
Purpose: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation retains the true 
purpose of bees? (1=it definitely does not retain the true purpose of bees 7=it definitely retains 
the true purpose of bees) 
Twenty-one participants failed one or more of the comprehension checks and were excluded from 
analysis.  Data was analyzed for the remaining 229 participants.   
Independent samples t-test indicated two things.  First our purpose manipulation was highly effective, 
Telos Preserved (M=5.58, SD=1.82, 95% CI [5.23, 5.92]), Telos Changed (M=1.69, SD=1.27, 95% CI 
[1.45, 1.91]), t(227)=-18.91, p<.001, d=2.48. Second, our manipulation of whether the bee preserved or 
5 
 
changed its purpose produced a very large effect on categorization judgments, with participants agreeing 
that the thing was a spider when its telos was changed (M=5.73, SD=1.54, 95% CI [5.44, 5.99]) and with 
participants agreeing that the thing was a bee when its telos was preserved (M=2.57, SD=1.69, 95% CI 
[2.25, 2.88]), t(227)=14.720, p<.001, d=1.96 (see Figure 1). Follow-up one sample t-tests indicated that 
categorization judgments were significantly below the neutral midpoint in Telos Preserved, t(107)=-8.73, 
p<.001, and significantly above the neutral midpoint in Telos Changed, t(120)=12.31, p<.001. 
Figure 1: Distributions in Categorization Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved 
The findings from study 1 indicate that despite superficial dissimilarity, preservation or change of telos 
had a massive effect on categorization judgments.  Even though the thing looks like a spider, participants 
were significantly more inclined to categorize the thing as a bee when it preserved its telos: pollinating 
flowers and making honey.  When it changed its telos and instead spun webs to catch and eat insects, 
participants categorized the thing as a spider.  And our manipulation check indicated that our 
manipulation was indeed tapping into people’s view that the telos of bees is to make honey and pollinate 
flowers.  Thus, in subsequent studies we will omit the manipulation check.  
Another important test of our tendency to essentialize categories comes from studies investigating 
categorization judgments in the context of a thing having its insides altered.  For instance, Gelman and 
Wellman (1991) gave children a case involving a dog that either had its outsides altered (e.g., fur 
removed) or its insides altered (e.g., blood and bones removed) and asked whether the thing after the 
change is still a dog.  Participants were significantly more inclined to think that the thing was no longer a 
dog when its insides had been altered.  But what if the insides of a thing weren’t simply removed but 
rather replaced with the insides of some other thing?  Our question is thus whether preservation or change 
of telos will continue to affect categorization judgments even when the insides of a thing have been 
replaced with the insides of some other thing. 
Study 1 involved only superficial transformation, not transformation of internal parts.  In study 2, we 
address whether preservation or change of telos has an effect even when internal parts are replaced.  
Moreover, in study 1, there was superficial dissimilarity between the things.  In study 2, we thus hold 
fixed superficial similarity: the thing continues to look like a bee despite having its insides replaced with 




2. Study 2: Transforming Insides 
We again recruited two-hundred and fifty participants (aged 18-63 years, mean age = 33 years; 97 
females; 98% reporting English as a native language) from Amazon Mechanical Turk who were tested in 
Qualtrics.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions [marked by brackets]: 
Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a 
special operation on a bee.  They decide to remove the insides of the bee and replace them with 
the insides from a spider.  Here is an image of the bee that they perform the special operation on: 
 
After the special operation, the insides were changed but it still looked like this: 
 
[Telos Changed: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special operation 
didn’t pollinate flowers or make honey.  Instead, it only spun webs to catch insects and eat 
them./Telos Preserved: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special 
operation didn’t spin webs to catch insects and eat them.  Instead, it only pollinated flowers and 
made honey.] 
Participants were then asked the same two comprehension questions as in study 1 and also asked the same 
test question about categorization. 
Twenty participants failed one or more of the comprehension questions and were excluded from the 
analysis.  As in study 1, our manipulation of whether the bee preserved or changed its telos produced a 
very large effect on categorization judgments, with participants agreeing that the thing was a spider when 
its telos was changed (M=5.00, SD=1.55, 95% CI [4.72, 5.28]) and with participants agreeing that the 
thing was a bee when its telos was preserved (M=1.97, SD=1.26, 95% CI[1.74, 2.19]), t(228)=16.55, 
p<.001, d=2.15 (see Figure 2). Follow-up one sample t-tests indicated that categorization judgments were 
significantly below the neutral midpoint in Telos Preserved, t(120)=-17.658, p<.001, and significantly 




Figure 2: Distributions in Categorization Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved 
Despite superficial similarity and despite the bee having its insides replaced with the insides of a spider, 
preservation or change of telos continued to have a very large effect on categorization judgments.  People 
were significantly more inclined to think the thing was a bee when it made honey and pollinated flowers, 
despite having the insides of a spider. And despite looking like a bee, people were significantly more 
inclined to think the thing was a spider when it spun webs to catch and eat insects.  Thus, studies 1 and 2 
indicate that preservation or change of telos plays a role in categorization judgments even when things 
have superficial similarity or dissimilarity and even when things have their insides replaced.  Study 3 
investigates whether preservation and change of telos would continue to affect categorization judgments 
when a bee is raised by spiders.   
Work by Gelman (2003; see also Keil, 1989) suggest that people tend to default to innate potential in 
categorization.  Thus, children will say that a baby kangaroo raised by goats will end up having a pouch 
and hopping (Gelman and Wellman, 1991).  But if, for instance, a newborn bee is raised by spiders and 
either preserves its original telos or changes its telos, this might override inferences about innate potential 
in categorization judgments.   
3. Study 3: Inheritance 
As in the first two studies, we again recruited 250 participants (aged 18-71 years, mean age = 37 years; 
116 females; 98% reporting English as a native language) who were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (marked in brackets]: 
Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a 
special experiment with a newborn bee.  After an egg hatches, they place the newborn bee in a 
cage full of spiders.  [Telos Changed: After two weeks, Suzy and Andy found that the thing that 
was placed in the cage full of spiders didn’t pollinate flowers or make honey.  Instead, it only 
spun webs to catch insects and eat them./Telos Preserved: After two weeks, Suzy and Andy 
found that the thing that was placed in the cage full of spiders didn’t spin webs to catch insects 
and eat them.  Instead, it only pollinated flowers and made honey.] 
They were then asked two comprehension questions: 
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Comprehension Check: Suzy and Andy performed special experiment with a bee. 
Comprehension Check: The thing that was placed in the cage full of spiders only spins webs to 
catch insects and eat them. 
Then they were asked the key test statement: 
Category: To what extent do you think that the thing placed in the cage full of spiders, after two 
weeks, is a bee or spider? (1=it is definitely a bee, 7=it is definitely a spider) 
Twenty-four participants failed one or more of the comprehension questions and were excluded from the 
analysis.  Yet again, our manipulation of whether the bee preserved or changed its purpose produced a 
very large effect on categorization judgments. Participants agreed that the thing was a spider when its 
telos was changed (M=4.52, SD=2.28, 95% CI [4.09, 4.94]) and participants agreed that the thing was a 
bee when its telos was preserved (M=1.48, SD=1.24, 95% CI [1.25, 1.70]), t(224)=12.42, p<.001, d=1.66 
(see Figure 3). Follow-up one sample t-tests indicated that categorization judgments were significantly 
below the neutral midpoint in Telos Preserved, t(112)=-21.54, p<.001, and significantly above the neutral 
midpoint in Telos Changed, t(112)=2.43, p<.05. 
 
Figure 3: Distributions in Categorization Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved 
 
Preservation or change of telos played an important role in categorization judgments.  Though some work 
suggests that innate potential plays a key role in categorization, nobody has investigated whether this 
might be overridden by information about whether the thing preserves or changes its telos.  Our findings 
here indicate that continuity of telos may indeed be more heavily weighted, overriding innate potential: a 
newborn bee, raised by spiders, that ends up spinning webs and catching insects is categorized as a spider. 
Our claim is that telos plays a key role in the kind of categorization we see in essentialist research.  Our 
results show that people rely on the telos to make judgments about persistence through (1) outer 
transformations, (2) inner transformations and (3) acquired characteristics. But one issue is that these 
results might be explained by people using an enriched prototype for bees and spiders in making 
categorization judgments, where the prototype includes teleological features.  If that’s right, then perhaps 
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essentialism isn’t guiding people’s categorization judgments in these cases.  This would be interesting in 
its own right since it would suggest that telos is part—indeed, perhaps even the central part—of the 
prototype.   
That said, our strategy for assessing essentialism follows that of Keil (1989) and Gelman (2003).  And 
across all these ways of probing for evidence of essentialism, we find evidence that telos plays a central 
role. The fact that we find that telos plays a crucial role in categorization judgments utilizing the same 
procedures that are used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking lends credence to our claim that we 
are indeed tapping into essentialists judgments.  But there is a more pointed test of essentialist thinking. 
Suppose the essence of being a bee is understood as some hidden factor within each bee that causes 
observable features of bees.  A natural candidate for this hidden factor might be DNA.  If a queen bee 
were then to lay eggs, we might naturally think that bees would hatch from the eggs.  And it would seem 
that the best explanation of this wouldn’t be that we are using something like a prototype.  Instead it 
would seem that this judgment would be based on an inference that the essence would be transmitted via 
unobservable features—e.g., DNA—and thereby give rise to further bees.  This raises the possibility that 
if people associate an essence with a telos then we should expect them to think that a telos can be 
transmitted to offspring.  If that’s right, then even if a bee undergoes superficial transformation, then 
provided it preserves its telos, people should judge that its offspring will be bees.  Thus, we explore next 
whether telos predicts judgments of inherited characteristics.   
4. Study 4: Offspring 
We recruited 350 participants (aged 18-69 years, mean age = 29 years; 156 females; 97% reporting 
English as a native language) who were assigned to one of two conditions (Telos Preserved, Telos 
Changed), which were the same as in study 1 except that we indicated that the bee was a queen bee.  After 
answering the same comprehension questions and answering the same categorization question as in study 
1, participants were given one of two cases (marked by brackets): 
After the special operation, the scientists now want to know what the thing's offspring will be 
like.  So they devise a special technique to have its eggs fertilized by a [bee/spider].   
After reading that the thing had its eggs fertilized by a bee or spider, participants were then asked: 
Offspring. To what extent do you think that things that will hatch from the eggs will be bees or 
spiders? (1=they will definitely be bees, 7=they will definitely be spiders) 
Thirty people were removed for failing one or more comprehension questions.  Data was analyzed for the 
remaining 320 participants.   
First, we replicated the findings from study 1 on category judgments, with participants agreeing that the 
thing was a spider when its telos was changed (M=5.34, SD=1.82, 95% CI [5.07, 5.62]) and with 
participants agreeing that the thing was a bee when its telos was preserved (M=2.63, SD=1.99, 95% CI 
[2.31, 2.94]), t(318)=12.679, p<.001, d=1.42. Second, and more importantly, a two-way ANOVA 
indicated a main effect of telos for the parent, Telos Preserved (M=2.79, SD=1.69)  and Telos Changed 
(M=3.98, SD=1.98), F(1, 316)=35.13, p<.001,  ηp2=.100, and a main effect of whether a bee (M=2.76, 
SD=1.88) or spider (M=4.03, SD=1.78) fertilized the eggs, F(1, 316)=41.10, p<.001,  ηp2=.115.  There 
was no interaction between telos of the parent and whether the parent’s eggs were fertilized by a bee or 
spider.  Follow-up t-tests indicated that when the eggs were fertilized by a bee, participants were more 
likely to think that spiders would hatch from the eggs when the telos of the original bee was changed to 
conform to the telos of a spider (M=3.41, SD=1.96, 95% CI [2.98, 3.83]) than when the telos was 
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preserved (M=2.10, SD=1.55, 95% CI [1.76, 2.44]) , t(158)=4.74, p<.001, d=.74 (see Figure 4). And 
when the eggs were fertilized by a spider, participants were more likely to think that spiders would hatch 
from the eggs when the telos of the original bee was changed to conform to the telos of a spider (M=4.51, 
SD=1.87, 95% CI [4.11, 4.91]) than when the telos was preserved (M=3.51, SD=1.53, 95% CI [3.16, 
3.85]) t(158)=3.63, p<.001, d=.59 (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Distributions in Offspring Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved 
 
The key finding here—that in both the bee-fertilized condition and the spider-fertilized condition, 
participants were more likely to say the offspring would now be a spider when the telos of the original 
bee was changed to conform to the telos of a spider— casts doubt on the claim that people are using an 
enriched prototype for bees and spiders in making categorization judgments.  Instead, these results 
suggest that people associate a telos with an essence.  People think that a telos can be transmitted to 
offspring.  When the telos changes, people are more likely to think the offspring will be members of the 
species that has that telos. And the most plausible explanation of this is that people operate with an 
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Aristotelian conception of essences.  That is, they are teleological essentialist in that the associate the 
essence of a thing with a telos. 
Our findings here suggest that people are not operating with an enriched prototype that centrally features 
teleological considerations in making category judgments.  But a stronger test of the claim that people do 
indeed associate the essence of a thing with a telos involves testing whether teleological essentialist 
judgments generate category judgments.  We investigate this in our final study. 
5. Study 5: Teleological Essentialism and Generation 
We recruited 120 participants (aged 18-62 years, mean age = 31 years; 49 females; 97% reporting English 
as a native language) who were assigned to one of two conditions (Telos Preserved, Telos Removed), 
which were the same as in study 1.  Participants answered the same two comprehension questions used in 
study 1.  They then made category judgments, using the same probe as in study 1, and were also ask: 
Essence: The thing after the changes no longer has the true essence of the original bee. (1-
strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
The essence probe was based on a similar probe used by De Frietas et al., 2017 (see also Newman, Bloom 
et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2015).  The presentation of both the category and essence probes was 
randomized. 
Two participants missed one or more comprehension questions and so data was analyzed for the 
remaining 118 participants. 
Preservation (M=3.03, SD=1.76, 95% CI [2.57, 3.48]) or loss (M=4.97, SD=2.00, 95% CI [4.46, 5.47]) of 
telos again has a significant effect on category judgments, t(117)=5.58, p<.001, d=1.03 (see Figure 5).  
Similarly, preservation (M=3.38, SD=2.05, 95% CI [2.85, 3.90]) or loss (M=5.57, SD=1.53, 95% CI 
[5.18, 5.93]) of telos has a significant effect on essence judgements, (117)=6.63, p<.001, d=1.21 (see 




Figure 5: Distributions in Categorization and Essence Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved 
 
To determine whether essence judgments generate category judgements, we tested for mediation.  We 
found that a regression model with Telos as a predictor of Category was significant, t(118)=-5.58, β=-
.458, p<.001, a regression model with Telos as a predictor of Essence was significant, t(118)=-6.63, β=-
.523, p<.001, a regression model with Essence as a predictor of Category was significant, t(118)=9.61, 
β=.664, p<.001, but that in a multiple regression model with both Telos and Essence as predictors of 
Category, the effect of Telos on Category was no longer significant, t(118)=-1.91, β=-.153, p=.059..1   
                                                          
1 Iacobucci et al. (2007) suggest that testing mediation using structural equation modeling is always superior to 
running a series of regressions. So we conducted a causal search on the data using Greedy Equivalence Search 
(GES). Roughly, GES operates by considering the possible models available given the different variables. GES 
begins by assigning an information score to the null model (i.e., a disconnected graph). GES then considers various 
possible arrows (“edges”) between the different variables. It begins by adding the edge that yields the greatest 
improvement in the information score (if there is such an edge) and repeats the process until additional edges would 
not further improve the information score. GES then considers deletions that would yield the greatest improvement 
in the information score (if there is such an edge), repeating this procedure until no further deletions will improve 
the score. In all cases, the orientation of the edges is given by edge-orientation rules in Meek (1997). Chickering 
(2002) shows that, given enough data, GES will return the true causal model of the data. GES is often interpreted as 





Figure 6: Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between Telos and Category 
mediated by Essence.  
We thus take these results, coupled with our findings from study 4, as providing strong evidence against 
the claim that people are operating with an enriched prototype that centrally features teleological 
considerations in making category judgments.  Our findings indicate the people associate the essence of a 
thing with a telos. 
5. Conclusion 
We found that people operate with a teleological view of essences.  People tend to categorize a thing on 
the basis of whether it preserves or changes its telos.  This arises despite superficial similarity or 
dissimilarity, inside replacement, acquired characteristics and inheritance.  Whereas studies of 
essentialism that utilize these various approaches sometimes turn up conflicting results, we found that 
manipulating telos generated a unified pattern of results. And we found evidence that teleological 
considerations affect essentialists judgments which in turn drive categorization judgments. 
Our results cohere with and extend a wide range of research indicating that teleology plays an important 
role in judgments of whether some collection of parts compose a further object (Rose and Schaffer, 2017) 
and in judgments of whether some object persists through part alterations (Rose, 2015; Rose, Schaffer and 
Tobia, forthcoming).  The current results extend the role of teleology to our conception of the essences of 
things. 
In light of our results, we propose that the idea that the placeholder for essences is sometimes elaborated 
by scientific essences should be replaced with the view that the placeholder for an essence is elaborated 
by a telos.  This elaboration is neither rare nor exceptional.  It may even be the case that teleological 
essentialism is in place from the start or that the placeholder is very short lived, elaborated and replaced 
by tele from a very early age.  Kelemen’s (1999) finding that, for instance, children claim that “mountain 
exist to give animals a place to climb” might, at least, suggest that essences are associated with tele rather 
than mere placeholders from an early age. The extent of the life of the placeholder is a further empirical 
                                                          
X2(1)=3.63, p>.05, BIC=-1.14.  Following Iacobucci et al. (2007) and Rose & Nichols (2013), we also tested an 
alternative model with category judgments mediating the effect of telos on essence judgments.  This model is a poor 
fit of the data, X2(1)=13.51, p<.001, BIC=8.73.  For further details and some applications of GES, see Chickering 




question.  For present purposes, our claim is simply that if there is a placeholder that gets elaborated, the 
elaboration is in terms of teleological essentialism, not scientific essentialism. 
It might be objected that our findings only indicate that behavior, not telos, plays a key role in 
categorization judgments (see e.g., Hampton et al., 2007). All of our cases involve the thing engaging in 
some behavior (e.g., spinning webs).  So it could be that behavior, and not telos, is having a major impact 
on essentialist judgments.  If that’s right, then perhaps essence isn’t elaborated by a kind of telos.  Instead 
it may be the case that our results only show that people operate with an enriched prototype where 
behavior plays a central role. 
We doubt that it is simply behavior and not telos guiding people’s essentialist judgments.  Instead, telic 
relevant behavior, such as spinning webs, is evidence for the possession of a telos.  As we saw above, 
Aristotle maintains that it is by nature and for an end (i.e., a telos) that a spider makes its web (Phys. 
199a, 30). Aristotle also allows that tele can be unfulfilled.  A spider could be externally prevented from 
spinning webs, which would frustrate its end. However, on Aristotle’s view, it wouldn’t thereby cease to 
be a spider, provided it still possessed the telos (NE. 1.5, 1.7). In concert with Aristotle’s view, it is easy 
to imagine a case where a spider is prevented from spinning webs but nonetheless possessed the spider 
telos.  And it is natural to think that it would still be a spider.   
We also think our current results begin to speak to the idea that telos and not behavior is playing a role in 
essentialist judgments.  In our pilot study, we asked people, for instance, “What is the true purpose of 
spiders?”.  And the vast majority of people said that the true purpose of spiders is to either make spin 
webs, catch insects and eat them or both.  It seems that people naturally identify telic relevant behavior as 
evidence of telos.  Moreover, in our fourth study, preservation and change in the original thing’s telos had 
a major impact on people’s predictions about what would hatch from some eggs. There was no behavior 
to guide these judgments.  The eggs hadn’t even hatched.  Instead, it seems that people expect the telos to 
be transmitted and that this, and not behavior, is what guides people’s predictions in this case. That said, 
we take it that it is a further empirical question whether telos or behavior plays a central role in these 
kinds of judgments.  And we hope for further work on this matter.   
One further important objection to our findings, is that, as Hampton et al. (2007) have shown, 
“essentialist categorization is highly dependent on the parameters of the task” (p. 1797).  It could thus be 
that the kind of teleological essentialist judgments we find are highly dependent on the specific tasks we 
have utilized.  But there is reason for thinking that our findings are not simply due to features of our tasks.  
Teleology, using very different tasks and measures, has been found to play a central role in judgments of 
both object composition and persistence (Rose, 2015; Rose and Schaffer, 2017; Rose Schaffer and Tobia, 
forthcoming).  Moreover, these various studies have varied a range of additional features, alongside 
teleological considerations, and in every single case teleology emerges as playing a major role both in 
judgments of object composition and persistence.  For instance, teleological considerations play a major 
role in persistence judgments even if a thing undergoes minor (e.g., denting) or major (e.g., smashed) 
changes (Rose, 2015); teleological considerations play a major role in personal identity judgments, even 
when moral considerations—such as whether the person becomes good or bad (see e.g., Strohminger and 
Nichols, 2014)—are made salient (Taylor, Kalbach and Rose, 2019); teleological considerations play a 
major role in judgments of object composition, even when varying whether the parts are fused, in contact 
or scattered (Rose and Schaffer, 2017); and teleological thinking also emerges early and persists through 
adulthood, even being retained despite professional training in physics (e.g., Kelemen, 1999; Kelemen et 
al., 2013).  We thus suspect that the role of teleology in essentialist judgments isn’t simply incidental to 
the tasks used here but instead reflect a deep, robust feature of human cognition.   
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Our view might also bear on recent theoretical work on essentialism. Based on several recent papers, 
George Newman and Joshua Knobe argue that there are two kinds of essentialism that fall under a 
broader General Essentialism (Newman & Knobe forthcoming). On their view, there is the Lockean kind 
of essentialism that applies to natural kinds, and there is a Platonic kind of essentialism that applies to 
kinds like scientist or punk rocker, which are value-laden.  According to Newman and Knobe, what these 
two kinds of essentialism have in common is that “people appear to believe that what binds together the 
different features of the category is the fact that they are all ways of embodying the same deeper value” 
(Newman and Knobe, forthcoming, p. 2; see also e.g., Knobe et al., 2013; Tobia et. al. forthcoming).  
General Essentialism is thus the view that the essence of essentialism is that there is some abstract 
structure that people both posit and draw on to explain how category members are related.  Lockean and 
Platonic essentialism are two forms that this abstract structure can take (Newman and Knobe, 
forthcoming, p. 3).  
The results from our studies suggest an alternative. It might be that what unifies natural kinds (like 
spider) and value-laden kinds (like scientist) is that in both cases, essences are tele.  This would provide a 
different, and perhaps even more unified, form of general essentialism.  Indeed, it may even provide a 
more compelling developmental account of essentialist thinking.  Our findings indicate that people 
operate with an Aristotelian view of essences when it comes to natural kinds.  It remains to be seen 
whether a similar approach will work for value-laden kinds. But there is reason to be optimistic that there 
is a deep and general way in which the way essences guide our judgments is best captured by teleological 
essentialism. 
Finally, we conclude by nothing that there are a number of further questions to be addressed.  To mention 
just one, there is a question concerning the connection between teleological properties and other 
properties of a thing.  We hope that future work will investigate this as well as the range of new questions 
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